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Abstract
One of the reasons for setting up an unemployment insurance scheme is to allow job
losers to smooth consumption. However, very little is known to date on the consumption
smoothing impact of unemployment benefits. Here, we test for the impact of unemploy-
ment benefits on changes in household food expenditure of individuals that have recently
experienced a job loss, allowing for different levels of household’s financial wealth. We
also study the relationship between unemployment benefits and financial wealth of the
unemployed. We use for the empirical analysis a unique dataset rich on information on
financial assets and debt of the unemployed. We conclude that there is significant hetero-
geneity in the consumption responses of job losers to the income shock. For households
without financial wealth at the time of job loss, unemployment benefits help smoothing
food consumption. The results of estimation also suggest considerable heterogeneity in
the relationship between borrowing and the level of benefits. For households running
debt before job loss, there is evidence that higher replacement rates lead to postponing
of paying off debt.
Keywords: Unemployment, Savings.
JEL Classification: J64, E21.
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1 Introduction
The literature on consumption has generally ignored the potential impact of unem-
ployment benefits on consumption smoothing of the unemployed. According to the life
cycle theory, an expected income shock will not influence the level of consumption, as
individuals will have accumulated a sufficient level of financial wealth and will run down
their assets or will borrow if their level of assets is not sufficiently high. The underly-
ing assumption is that individuals are not subject to borrowing constraints. However,
job losers are bound to experience borrowing constraints in reality. For example, credit
institutions typically use the individual’s labour market status as a screening device for
providing loans. The empirical literature on unemployment benefits has not paid much
attention to the consumption behaviour of the unemployed either.1 This in spite of the
fact that income shedding motives are a rationale for providing unemployment insurance.
Gruber (1997) studied the role played by unemployment benefits in consumption
smoothing of the unemployed, and concluded, using PSID data for the United States,
that a fall of ten percent points in the replacement ratio leads to a decrease in average
food expenditure of 2.5%. Browning and Crossley (2001) specified a theoretical model
of the consumption behaviour of the unemployed, which they estimated using data on
total consumption for an ‘inflow’ sample of Canadian job-losers. The authors find that a
decrease of ten percentage points in the replacement ratio would result in a decrease in
total expenditure of 0.8%.2 Browning and Crossley (2001) also found that the replace-
ment rate affects consumption only when households hold no assets. A related issue was
raised by Gruber (2001) who concluded that a higher replacement rate leads to a smaller
decrease in wealth. Hamermesh and Slesnick (1998), investigated the impact of unem-
1 The emphasis has always been on the incentive effects of unemployment benefits. More recently,
empirical studies on the impact of wealth on labour market transitions have appeared, like Stancanelli
(1999), Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001), and Bloemen (2002).
2 This smaller estimate than the one found by Gruber (1997) may be due to differences in the datasets
used for the estimation, although typically food expenditure is less responsive than total expenditure
to income shocks. Gruber (1997) used data from the PSID to estimate his model, while Browning and
Crossley (2001) used data drawn from a sample of Canadians, unemployed for over six months. See
Gruber (2001) and Browning and Crossley (2001) for more comments on these differences.
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ployment benefits on households’ well-being, concluding that unemployment insurance
helps to keep the consumption level of households affected by job loss as high as that of
other comparable households in the economy.
Here we expand on the existing literature, by providing a separate analysis for the
impact of the income shock, respectively, on consumption smoothing, savings and debt
behavior of an ‘inflow’ sample of job-losers. We make use of a unique dataset which
collects information on income, financial assets, debt and (food) consumption, both at
the individual and at the household level, at different points in time, before and after
entry into unemployment. This is the ‘Survey of Living Standards during Unemployment
(LSUS)’.
The approach followed to model the consumption behaviour of the unemployed is
similar to that put forward by Gruber (1997) and Browning and Crossley (2001). We
measure the income shock that accompanies the job loss by means of the replacement
ratio and we estimate its impact on the level of consumption measured just before job
loss and three months after. The life cycle theory provides a natural link between the
negative income shock and changes in consumption on the one hand and changes in
wealth and debt on the other hand. If the household manages to smooth consumption by
running down financial wealth, the income shock affects the level of financial wealth from
one period to another but consumption is smoothed. If the household’s stock of wealth is
not sufficiently high, the household may want to borrow and may well run into borrowing
constraints. While running debt maybe subject to borrowing constraints and restrictions
to access credit, cumulating assets should be entirely up to the individual. Here, we
allow for a differential impact of the replacement ratio on savings and debt behaviour, by
estimating separate models for the changes in financial wealth and debt.
Food expenditure data, used for our analysis, are supposedly less sensitive to an income
shock than total consumption expenditure. Individuals experiencing an income shock may
cut more substantially on durable expenditure than on food expenditure. For example,
they may postpone to buy new clothes or to replace furniture. Browning and Crossley
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(2000) deal with this topic extensively.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section lays out the theoretical
background. The main feature of the data and some exploratory analysis of changes in
consumption, financial wealth and debt holdings are presented in Section 3. Results of
estimation of the relationship between unemployment benefits and consumption changes
are discussed in Section 4. The relationship between changes in financial wealth and debt,
respectively, and unemployment benefits is investigated in Section 5 of the paper. Section
6 summarizes the results of various sensitivity checks that were performed to test for the
robustness of the empirical estimates. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2 Theoretical background
The life cycle theory of consumption describes the consumption and saving behaviour
of individuals that decide on the intertemporal allocation of income to consumption and
savings. Assets accumulation and borrowing act as smoothing devices for intertemporal
consumption. Uncertainty of future income is taken into account to model consump-
tion patterns. In particular, to model the effect of an income shock due to job loss on
consumption, the layoff probability can be incorporated into the model.3
Let the intratemporal utility function be denoted by u(ct, dt), which defines utility
in period t as a function of consumption in period t, ct, and the labour market state
occupied, dt (dt = 1 indicating employment, dt = 0 indicating unemployment). The
level of wealth at the beginning of period t is denoted by At. The interest rate and the
rate of time preference are denoted by r and ρ respectively. Wage income, unemployment
benefits and other income are indicated by wt, bt and µt.
4 Thus, the intratemporal budget
constraint reads
ct + At+1 = (1 + r)At + dtwt + (1− dt)bt + µt (1)
3 See, for instance, Blundell, Magnac and Meghir (1997).
4 µt includes the income of other household members. For the sake of exposition, it is assumed that the
income of other household members is not affected by the job loss of the individual under consideration.
We relax this assumption later.
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The objective of the individual is the maximization of the expected present value of
utility, subject to the budget constraint (1). Blundell et al. (1997) show that the usual
Euler equation for consumption remains valid if it is accounted for a layoff rate σt, which
defines the probability that a job loss materializes.5 Thus, for an individual, not subject
to liquidity constraints and employed in period t, we may write
∂u(c1t , 1)
∂ct
=
1 + r
1 + ρ
Et
(1− σt)∂u(cd
∗
t+1
t+1 , d
∗
t+1)
∂ct+1
+ σt
∂u(c0t+1, 0)
∂ct+1
 (2)
The supercript for consumption indicates that the utility maximizing level of consumption
will in general differ between labour market states, due to differences in income, and
in (marginal) utility. The labour market state d∗t+1 denotes the intertemporal utility
maximizing labour market state in period t+1. The expectation operator in (2) refers to
uncertainty in wages and other income.
The representation of the Euler equation (2) reveals the role of uncertainty in job loss
on the individual’s behaviour. The average worker will have a job loss probability that is
between zero and one and will save, accordingly, a certain amount every period. If a job
loss materializes, the marginal utility of consumption receives a shock, both because of a
change in the labour market state (the ‘permanent effect’) and because of the negative
shock in income (the ‘benefit effect’). In the absence of liquidity constraints consumption
is smoothed by saving or borrowing.6
The standard method of estimating an Euler equation is based on the recognition
that the Euler equation establishes a moment condition. The moments are replaced by
their sample counterparts and the model parameters may be estimated by GMM. If the
sample is not selected on the basis of labour market movements, this is (under certain
assumptions) a valid procedure, also in a model which includes uncertainty in the labour
market state. In the present context, however, we are interested in the effect of an income
5 Notice that the layoff rate may also be subject to uncertainty because, for example, of macro shocks
to the economy. In the exposition we abstract from this type of uncertainty.
6 In the one extreme case in which the risk of job loss is zero, no additional savings will be made to
prepare for the job loss, while in the other extreme in which the individual completely foresees the job
loss, for example, if s/he has a fixed term appointment that comes to expiration, the expected income
loss is anticipated and may be fully incorporated in the individual savings decision.
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shock due to job loss on consumption, and for this purpose we use a sample of individuals
experiencing a job loss. Browning and Crossley (2001) discuss this issue extensively. They
show that the bias in the moment condition is equal to the permanent shock due to job
loss. Their result is an important guideline for the empirical specification, since it suggests
that in a regression framework for consumption changes covariates that are related to the
permanent shock (i.e. to the change in marginal utility that may come from a change in
labour market state) need to be included to serve as controls for the permanent shock
to be able to measure the ‘pure’ consumption smoothing effect of the benefit. To this
purpose one may include variables that account for previous job characteristics (earnings,
tenure, industrial sector) and individual characteristics like age and family composition.
If liquidity constaints are present, the marginal utility of consumption will be affected
by the benefit effect. In this respect, Browning and Crossley (2001) argue that the re-
placement ratio affects consumption behaviour, and hence enters the regression equation,
if households are liquidity constrained. In particular, asset holdings may be used as an
indicator of liquidity constraints, but past earnings may also proxy liquidity constraints.
The mirror image of consumption behaviour is saving and borrowing behaviour. Saving
and borrowing are devices to smooth consumption. Unemployment insurance benefits
provide job losers with an alternative or additional smoothing device. Thus, if households
are able to smooth consumption completely by running down wealth, we would expect
to find a significant impact of the replacement rate on household wealth. Running down
wealth can be achieved by running down assets and by borrowing. A precautionary
savings motive or liquidity constraints may weaken the possible relationship between the
replacement rate and the saving behavior of households.
To make more explicit the relation between the income shock due to job loss on the
one hand and the saving and borrowing behaviour on the other hand, we may write the
budget constraint (1) as
∆At+1 = (rAt + dtwt + (1− dt)bt + µt)− ct (3)
From Equation (3) we can conclude that if individuals manage to smooth consumption,
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assets are run down, and/or borrowing takes place. The higher is the replacement rate,
the lower will be the need to run down assets or to borrow. In the case of complete
liquidity constraints, in which neither assets can be run down nor borrowing is possible,
the left hand side of (3) is unaffected and consumption follows completely the income
change. Thus, a relationship between the replacement rate and the change in wealth
will be absent. In intermediate cases, in which individuals can run down assets, but not
sufficiently to smooth consumption, or can borrow a little, the model predicts a weaker
relationship between the replacement rate and changes in wealth than in the absence of
liquidity constraints. Summarizing, the change in income due to a job loss is divided
between a change in consumption and a change in wealth due to the adding up property
implied by (3). How this division takes place depends on the extent to which the consumer
is liquidity constrained. The precautionary savings motive may be an additional factor
that affects this division.7
The theoretical model assumes the existence of perfect capital markets and therefore
does not distinguish between saving and borrowing: borrowing is simply treated as nega-
tive saving. However, individuals who wish to borrow may be subject to access limitations
to the credit market, whereas assets accumulation is up to the individual. Access to debt
may proxy liquidity constraints. Therefore, in the empirical analysis we look separately
at the relationship between the benefit ratio, changes in the level of financial wealth and
debt holdings.
The model presented describes individual consumption behaviour. However, in the
data, consumption is observed at the household level and the unemployed in the sample
are all household heads. The effect of the income shock experienced by the head of the
household on the household’s consumption is likely to be smaller the larger are the other
sources of household income. To account for this, Browning and Crossley (2001) use
an ‘importance adjusted’ replacement ratio, which is given by the relative change in the
unemployed’s earnings multiplied by the ‘importance’ of the head’s earnings (the ratio of
7 Since we have only data on food consumption we cannot test this adding up property.
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the head’s earnings before job loss to the total household income before job loss). This
amounts to including the change in the head’s earnings relative to the total household
income.8
3 The data used for the empirical analysis
We make use of a unique dataset which collects information on income, financial
assets, debt and (food) consumption, both at the individual and at the household level, at
different points in time, before and after entry into unemployment, for an ‘inflow’ sample of
the unemployed. This is the ‘Survey of Living Standards during Unemployment (LSUS)’,
collected in 1983-84, which is still about the only dataset useful for the purposes of our
research, as it is extremely rich on information on financial wealth of the unemployed.9
Can the results of the analysis with the LSUS be generalized to hold at current times?
At the time the LSUS survey was carried out, the underlying macro-economic situation
was rather different as unemployment hit record levels in the UK. On the other hand, the
unemployment benefit system was more or less the same than the one currently in place,
at least for the first 6 months to one year of unemployment, and conditions of access to
credit for the unemployed have not changed substantially.
The unemployed in the LSUS sample all started their observed unemployment spell in
the summer of 1983, when they registered at mainland Great Britain unemployment ben-
efit offices, from whose files the survey sample was drawn. A sample of benefit claimants
8 This procedure is grounded in the literature on household behaviour, from which it can be formally
derived. The simplest model of household behaviour is the unitary model, which assumes one household
utility function and pools together the income of all household members to determine consumption choices.
In the collective model, on the other hand, the level of income of each household member contributes
to determine their bargaining position within the household and may, therefore, have a separate effect
on individual consumption. As information about consumption is available to us only at the household
level, it is not possible to identify the unitary model from the collective model.
9 The British Household Panel Survey only collects information on individual assets and debt at one
snapshot point in time, while the LSUS enables one to observe financial wealth before and after entry
into unemployment. Moreover, the BHPS covers a population sample and therefore a stock sample of
the unemployed rather than an inflow sample of the unemployed. As a consequence, the analysis of
consumption smoothing and financial wealth accumulation of the unemployed using the BHPS would
need to control for unemployment duration, which is not exogenous to the model. Moreover, the number
of observations on unemployed will be much lower for a given wave, so only the pooling of many waves
will lead to the same number of observations as LSUS.
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with the following characteristics was interviewed: (i) household heads, i.e. married men
or single people of either gender; (ii) aged between 20 and 58 years. Only those individuals
that remained unemployed for about three months following the start of their unemploy-
ment spell were interviewed. All the information in the survey is self-reported by the
unemployed. The interviews were conducted personally by the interviewers at the homes
of the survey participants. The first interview, conducted three months after the start of
their (registered) unemployment spell, contained retrospective questions concerning the
situation one month before the start of the unemployment spell.
For our analysis, we selected a subsample of individuals that reported to be employed
at tk; reported a positive amount of net earnings at tk; participated in the first interview
(at t1, three months after the loss of their jobs); reported positive benefit income at t1,
and reported on (food) consumption levels, both at tk and t1. The unemployed reporting
no benefit receipts were excluded from the sample as they may be misreporting benefits.10
Moreover, we excluded sample observations with a replacement ratio (based on earnings
one month before the first interview and benefits at the first interview) of 200% or more,
and observations with reported relative (food) consumpion changes that exceed 200%.
Thus, we are left with a sample of 1315 observations.11
We use information on average weekly food expenditure, financial assets and debt
of the unemployed at two different points in time: one month before the start of the
unemployment spell (labelled time tk) and three months into the spell (labelled time t1).
Individuals are unemployed for three months at t1. Changes in consumption, financial
wealth and debts from tk to t1 are measured over a four-months period, three months of
10 Although registering at benefit offices as just starting an unemployment spell, which followed a job
spell, they would not be entitled to either insurance or assistance benefits, three months into unemploy-
ment. If they had exhausted their entitlement to UI, due to the “link spell rule” or they did not have
enough contributions, they should still be able to claim SB benefits (see Stancanelli, 1994, for more details
on this).
11 The total number of participants in the first survey is 2923. The number of individuals that reports
to be employed at tk is 1747, of which 1470 report a positive amount of earnings. Out of the sample of
individuals that report to be employed and report positive earnings, 1423 report positive benefit income
at t1. However, 13 observations show a replacement ratio of 2 or larger, and 14 report a relative change in
food consumption larger than 200%. Finally, for 88 observations, the relative change in food consumption
from tk to t1 is not observed.
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which cover a period of unemployment. Browning and Crossley (2001) use data from a
Canadian inflow sample of individuals, unemployed for longer than six months. Gruber
(1997) uses data from the PSID, selecting a sample of individuals that were currently
unemployed but reported to be employed in the earlier wave.
Reported average weekly food consumption for the LSUS sample was 3125 pennies
three months before entry into unemployment, at tk, and 2511 pennies three months into
the unemployment spell, at t1. Data from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) for 1982,
show that average weekly food consumption expenditure was equal to 3265 pennies for
employed households and to 2545 for unemployed households. This validates the LSUS
data on food consumption and supports our hypothesis of an income shock to the job
losers in the sample.
Total financial wealth is obtained by adding up the amounts of assets reported in
the following categories: (i) current account; (ii) deposit account; (iii) building societies,
national savings and trustee savings accounts; (iv) stocks, bonds and other securities.
Total debt includes the following types of debt holdings: (i) a loan with a bank or a finance
house; (ii) an overdraft with a bank or credit card; (iii) any arrears with payments; (iv)
money owed to friends or relatives. Total financial wealth and total debt holdings were
computed adding up the asset and debt components (listed above) of both the head of
the household and the spouse, when present. We control in the analysis for the receipt of
redundancy or severance payments, which are paid at the end of the job which precedes
the start of the unemployment spell. These payments are higher for jobs with higher
wages and are a function of job tenure.12
The replacement ratio is constructed by dividing information on benefit income at
t1 by the earnings at tk. The unemployment benefit variable is constructed as the sum
of receipts of Unemployment Insurance benefit (UI), which is conditional mainly on a
sufficient contributions record, and Supplementary Benefit (SB), that is means-tested on
12 They are normally available only to those unemployed with previous employment spells longer than
2 years.
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household’s resources.13 At the time of the LSUS survey, Unemployment Insurance bene-
fits were flat rate and SB benefits could be claimed as from the start of the unemployment
spell. Both UI and SB had additions for dependent spouse and children.14 Housing ben-
efits were not counted into the unemployment benefit variable but entered separately.15
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. The percentage of women in the
sample is relatively low (5.2%), due to the selection criterion of the sample (e.g. household
heads). Most household heads (82.7%) report to be married at time t1. Furthermore,
32.2% of the respondents in our sample report to have no children, and 29% have children
younger than six. The percentage of individuals that worked part time before job loss
is 3.7%. In the five years preceding the survey, 45.3% had not experienced any spell of
unemployment;16 25.1% had experienced one spell; 14% two spells and 15.6% more than
two spells. The survey includes information on the skill level and the industrial sector
of the previous job. Accordingly, we distinguish three different skill levels. The highest
skill level, which includes professional and intermediate workers, applies to 24.4% of the
sample respondents. Skilled workers are the largest group, covering 45.5% of the sample,
while the semi-skilled and unskilled worker (the lowest skill group) represent 30% of the
sample. We compute five indicators for different industrial sectors, covering construction,
chemistry and engineering, hotels and services, other manufacturing and other industries.
13 Ideally, one would like to have administrative information on benefit receipts. However, Stancanelli
(1994) found that some consistency checks performed rather well. For example, she found that 71.2% of
the unemployed that reported to receive unemployment insurance payments reported payments exactly
equal to the official amounts, and 88.2% reported amounts that differed for less than £1 from the official
figures.
14 Current unemployment benefits in the UK have a very similar structure, with the two benefit
components, insurance (UI) and assistance (SB) merged into a single benefit payment, the jobseeker
allowance.
15 Individuals could receive them also when in work. Until April 1983 housing benefit could be paid
either together with SB benefits or separately by the local authorities. After April 1983, they were paid
separately from SB by the local authorities.
16 A question is asked on the number of unemployment spells in the past five years.
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3.1 Descriptives of the replacement ratio, consumption and fi-
nancial wealth variables
Table 2 contains sample statistics on consumption, wealth and income variables. The
data show that 20% of the households receive a benefit of 2500 pennies per week, which
corresponds to the flat rate UB. Over 75% of the observations receives a higher amount,
and the empirical distribution does not show any obvious spikes above 2500 so it shows
quite some variation in amounts. The mean benefit income is 4020 (with the median
quite close to it), which is about 1.6 time the flat rate amount and roughly equal to
the flat rate UB plus the UB addition for dependent spouse (1545 pennies per week).
Individuals receive more than the flat rate benefits depending (non-linearly) on the number
of children, the earnings of the spouse and the amount of wealth, measured at the start
of the unemployment spell.
The average replacement ratio in the sample is 0.49. The data used by Gruber (1997)
and Browning and Crossley (2001) cover completely exogenous sources of variation in
the replacement rate: Gruber (1997) uses variation across states and across time, whereas
Browning and Crossley (2001) exploit a change in the benefit system. Since our data covers
a period of a few months, no such exogenous source of variation is available. Nevertheless,
there is a great deal of variation in replacement rates due to the fact that benefits are partly
means-tested, depend on the employment status of spouse, on the number of children and
on the amount of contributions accumulated.17
To see how much weight the earnings of the head have in total household income,
Table 2 also contains the ratio of the head’s earnings to the total household income at tk.
The mean (median) value for this ratio is 0.82 (0.86). The 75% quantile shows a value of
1. Table 2 contains also information on other sources of household income. This includes
the income of the spouse, and housing benefits.
A large difference is observed between the mean level of financial assets and the median
level. This reflects the skewness of data on wealth. We observe the same for debt. We
17 At the time of the LSUS two reduced flat rates, equal, respectively, to one half and two thirds of the
full UB flat rate were payable to the unemployed with uncomplete contribution records.
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observe a fall in food consumption after inception of the unemployment spell. The mean
food consumption at t1, three months after entry into unemployment, is lower than the
mean food consumption at tk, one month before unemployment. The same is true for all
the quantiles considered of the distribution of food consumption.
Table 3 illustrates relative food consumption changes. The mean and median relative
change show a decrease in food expenditure of 17% following the job loss of the house-
hold head. Changes in consumption for two subsamples are reported: (i) the subsample
of households that reported positive financial wealth (73.1%) and (ii) the subsample of
households that did not receive redundancy or severance payments (72.2%). The per-
centage of households reporting a decrease in consumption is smaller (56.3%) for the first
subsample, which is consistent with the intuition that households with financial assets are
better able to smooth consumption. Since only households reporting positive wealth can
run down assets, this is the more interesting subgroup to look at to analyze the change in
wealth: setting the subsample reporting positive wealth at time k equal to 100, the per-
centage reporting positive wealth has dropped by almost 13% (to 87.3), three months into
the unemployment spell. For households that do not receive redundancy payments nor
severance pay (72.2% of the sample) the decrease in consumption is slightly larger than
for the total sample. The percentage of households reporting a decrease in consumption
is also larger for this subsample.
Finally, note that 37.4% of the households report no change in consumption. This
could be due to the fact that (i) we look at food consumption, which may be relatively
inelastic with respect to shocks in income, (ii) we are looking at a time lapse of four
months, which may be too short to observe changes in consumption for some of the
households and (iii) rounding errors of households that in their own experience did not
change their consumption pattern. Browning and Crossley (2001) also found a peak at
zero total consumption change, even though the period over which they measured the
change in consumption is 6 months. It is interesting to note that in our sample the peak
at zero is larger for the subsample of households that do report positive wealth and smaller
13
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for households without end-of-job payments.
Table 3 shows that the mean level of financial assets increases, while the median level
decreases. As some of the households report no financial wealth, we cannot compute
the relative change in financial wealth, as we did for consumption. On the other hand,
looking at changes in levels is difficult because of the large skewness of the distribution
of the differences.18 Therefore, we shall consider the ‘pseudo relative change’, defined as
∆ ln(1 + At), the change in the logarithm of one plus the level of wealth.
19 The sample
mean is -0.4. The percentage of respondents reporting positive financial wealth falls from
tk to t1. Initially 73.5% of the total sample reports positive financial wealth. Three
months after job loss, this percentage falls to 67.5.
For debt the sample mean of the ‘pseudo relative change’ is positive (0.48). Almost
half of the households in the sample (48%) reports some positive debt at tk. There is a
clear increase in the number of households running debt three months after the job loss:
at t1, 58.4% of the households report some positive debt, which amounts to an increase
of 10% points.
4 The impact of benefits on consumption smoothing
As shown earlier (Table 3), the unemployed in the sample experienced on average a
decrease in food expenditure of 17%, with small differences for different subsamples of
the unemployed. Here we estimate the relationship between the size of the income shock
due to the job loss, measured by the replacement ratio, and the change in consumption.
The replacement ratio (minus one) is weighted by the importance of the household head’s
earnings relative to the total household income before job loss. The dependent variable
is the relative change in consumption.
In order to estimate the ‘pure’ effect of unemployment benefits (measured by the
replacement ratio) on consumption smoothing, it is important to account for factors that
18 The skewness for changes in wealth from tk to t1 is 7.9.
19 In the literature, the practice of transforming data on assets by adding one and taking the logarithm
to correct for the scale effects, has been applied quite often. An alternative transformation is the inverse
hyperbolic sine, see Burbidge, Magee and Robb (1988).
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may influence the marginal utility of consumption in the different labour market states
and the lay-off rate, as argued in Section 2. Therefore, we include in the empirical
regression variables that are related to the previous job, such as the net earnings before
job loss, the skill level, the industrial sector and a dummy variable indicating whether
the job was part-time. To measure the labour force attachment of the individual we
use information on previous experiences of unemployment in the five years preceding the
observed unemployment spell. We would expect this indicator to be inversely related to
the lay-off rate, so that individuals that were not unemployed in the past five years may
experience a larger fall in consumption. On the other hand, past unemployment may
reduce the level of assets. We account for demographic characteristics and household
composition variables. We include a dummy for the employment status of the spouse in
the year before the job loss of the head. One may also want to include lagged wealth and
debt as they capture the financial situation of the household before the job loss. However,
these regressors may be correlated with the error term if there is time constant unoberved
heterogeneity in, say, preferences.20
Table 4 contains the regression results. In regression 1, the importance of the head’s
earnings in total household income before job loss and the replacement ratio weighted by
this importance fraction show no significant effect on the relative change in consumption.
We find a positive and decreasing effect for the amount of (lump-sum) end-of-job pay-
ments: households which receive a larger amount of end-of-job payments experience on
average a lower decrease in consumption. The dummies for positive wealth, positive debt
and positive end-of-job payments do not show up significant. The level of net earnings
before job loss is found to influence the consumption change negatively, but the marginal
effect becomes smaller the larger is the level of net earnings.21
The dummy variable for house ownership without a mortgage is significant: job losers
20 We ran all regressions with and without lagged wealth and debt, variables and to find that they
have hardly any effect on the sign of the coefficient on the replacement rate. In what follows, we present
results of estimation without these regressors.
21 Higher order terms of net earnings did not have a significant effect on the relative change in con-
sumption.
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who are house-owner outright, without a mortgage, experience a lower decrease in con-
sumption than the other unemployed. House ownership with a mortgage does not appear
to make a significant difference to consumption changes. Households with a head who had
a part time job before job loss experience a significantly lower decrease in consumption.
The difference between the marginal utility of working part time and the marginal utility
of not working at all is likely to be smaller than the difference between the marginal
utility of working full time and that of not working. Therefore, the consumption shock
can be expected to be smaller for those who worked part time. Households whose head
was not unemployed in the past five years experience a lower decrease in consumption,
suggesting that this variable captures ability to save. Age has a significant positive ef-
fect on the relative change in consumption:22 the older is the job loser, the smaller is
the drop in consumption. Age may correlate positively with the financial position of the
household. Furthermore, the older the head of the household, the harder it may be for
the household to change existing consumption patterns. Finally, we see that the drop in
food consumption is smaller for households with young children: this probably indicates
that the presence of young children affects the marginal utility of consumption.
Regression 2 in Table 4 estimates a more flexible specification of the relation between
changes in consumption and the replacement rate, which allows the impact of benefits on
consumption to differ for households reporting a positive amount of assets and/or end-
of-job payments, by including cross-effects of the replacement rate with these variables.23
The estimation results indicate that for households who report neither asset holdings
nor receipts of end-of-job payments, there is a significantly positive relation between the
replacement rate and the relative change in food consumption. For these households, a
smaller replacement rate translates into a larger fall in food consumption after the job loss:
a drop in the replacement rate of 10% leads, for a household where the head’s earnings
22 Age squared turned out not to be significant.
23 To make sure that the cross effects do not merely measure differences in the importance of the head’s
earning in total household income between households with and without financial wealth (and with and
without end-of-job payments), we also included cross-effects of the importance weights and these dummy
variables.
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are the only source of income, to a 2% fall in food expenditure.
This is a somewhat smaller effect than the 2.5% found by Gruber (1997), without
distinguishing job losers by their financial situation. It is larger than the 1.3% estimate
of the same effect found by Browning and Crossley (2001), for total expenditure and for
households reporting no assets before job loss. However, at least qualitatively, the results
from these different studies are comparable. In particular, our finding of an insignificant
effect for all households might be explained by the much smaller proportion (27%) of
households with no wealth in our dataset, than in the sample used by Browning and
Crossley (2001) (66%).
5 The impact of benefits on wealth accumulation be-
haviour
The descriptive statistics given in Table 3 show that after entry into unemployment
households run down assets. In particular, we observe that the percentage of households
running debt increases. The life cycle model of consumption suggests that there is a
relation between the size of the income shock and the degree to which households run
down assets or borrow. However, a low level of wealth and/or borrowing constraints may
impede this relationship. In this section, we analyse whether changes in asset levels and
debt holdings are influenced by the size of the replacement rate.
5.1 Changes in financial wealth and the replacement rate
First, we regress the pseudo-relative change in wealth (from period tk to t1) on the re-
placement ratio. For this purpurse we restrict the sample to households reporting positive
wealth at tk.
24,25 The analysis is to some extent comparable to Gruber (2001), who also
relates the logarithm of wealth to the replacement rate, using a regression framework, and
24 We do not exclude observations reporting zero wealth at t1, once they entered unemployment.
25 We did an auxiliary Probit analysis to gain some insights into the characteristics of households
reporting positive wealth. We found that the probability of reporting positive wealth is higher for the
unemployed with higher earnings before job loss, a working spouse, fewer unemployment spells in the
previous 5 years and a higher level of education.
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excluding households reporting zero wealth.
We present results of estimation of our model in Table 5.26 The replacement rate does
not show a significant effect on the change in financial wealth. End-of-job payments have
a (decreasing) positive effect on financial wealth, allowing households either to dissave
less or to increase asset holdings. Age has a significantly positive impact, indicating that
older individuals tend to dissave less. Similar findings apply to married people and to
those that have not been unemployed in the past five years.
As an alternative for the OLS-regression, we ran an ordered probit regression (see
Table 5), distinguishing three groups: households with an increase in financial wealth
(31% of the households reporting positive financial wealth at tk); households reporting no
change in financial wealth (13%); and households reporting a decrease in financial wealth
(56%). The advantage of the ordered probit model is that it is much less sensitive to
skewness and noisiness in the dependent variable. The replacement rate again shows no
significant effect. Finally, we ran a median regression. This method of estimation is less
sensitive to outliers than OLS. Again, we do not find a significant effect of the replacement
rate on changes in financial wealth. The same result was found for a regression of changes
in financial wealth levels, used as an alternative to the logarithmic transformation.
Various additional sensitivity checks were carried out. For example, we did a regression
of changes in saving for the selective subsample of households which reported a decrease
in financial wealth. No significant relation between the replacement rate and the decrease
in financial wealth could be detected. We also made a distinction between households who
reported to have used all their assets from period tk to t1
27 and households who decreased
wealth holdings but not to zero, for which a significant relationship was perhaps more
likely to be found. We ran separate regressions of changes in wealth holdings for either
subgroup, and also we ran an ordered probit (comparable to the regression in Table 5),
26 We have also ran regressions which included (a polynomial in) the level of wealth and debt in the
right hand side. For the same reason as for the consumption equation, we present results without these
variables among the regressors. The qualitative result for the replacement rate effect is not affected by
the inclusion or exclusion of these variables.
27 There are 122 of such households in the sample, representing 9.3% of the total sample, and 12.6%
of the subsample of household with positive wealth at tk.
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with individuals reporting a decrease in wealth holdings split up in the two subgroups.
None of these proved significant.
The theory indicates that the replacement rate has a positive impact on the change in
financial wealth if the amount of financial wealth available to the household is sufficiently
high (see Section 2). The empirical finding of an insignificant relation may suggest that for
most households in the sample the stock of financial wealth is relatively low. Indeed, we
saw an increase in the percentage of households reporting no financial wealth after entry
into unemployment (table 3). Besides, households may not want to decumulate wealth
substantially if they have a precautionary savings motive: if households are risk averse
and the length of their unemployment spell is uncertain, they will be more reluctant to
decumulate wealth.
5.2 Borrowing, postponement of paying off debt, and the re-
placement rate
Here we regress changes in debt on the replacement ratio, to investigate the ability of
households to respond to the income shock. First, we ran a regression (not shown in the
table) with the pseudo relative change in debt as the dependent variable and for all house-
holds in the sample. The coefficient estimate of the importance weighted replacement ratio
did not show up significant, but we found that households reporting end-of-job payments
experience, on average, a smaller increase in debt, house owners with a mortgage register
an increase in debt higher than the average and households with a larger number of chil-
dren experience, on average, a larger change in debt.28 Next, we ran a regression where
we allowed the effect of the replacement rate on changes in debt to differ for households
(not) reporting debt before job loss. The results of estimation (not shown) indicate that
for households running debt before job loss, the change in debt is smaller, the higher the
replacement ratio, suggesting that households can postpone paying off debt, the higher is
28 The first of these significant results is in line with the results in Table 3. The second, signals easier
access to credit thanks to house-ownership. The third, is consistent with the result of the consumption
regression, which showed that households with more children decrease consumption less: increasing debt
may be used to finance this smaller decrease.
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their replacement rate. For households reporting no debt before job loss, no significant
relationship could be detected. Then, we allowed the impact of the replacement rate on
changes in debt to differ for households (not) reporting positive amounts of end-of-job
payments, to find that the replacement rate has a significant impact on changes in debt
only for households that received end-of-job payments -perhaps signalling some capacity
to postpone paying off debt.
Our preferred regression, shown in Table 6, allows the effect of the replacement rate
on changes in debt to vary for (i) households reporting positive end-of-job payments and
debt before job loss, (ii) households not reporting any end-of-job payments but running
debt before job loss, (iii) households reporting positive end-of-job payments but no debt
before job loss and (iv) households not reporting any end-of-job payments nor debt before
job loss (set as the reference group). For households of type (i) and (ii), we find that
the replacement rate affects significantly the change in debt, a higher replacement rate
leading to a smaller change in debt. In particular, the impact of the replacement rate
on the change in debt is larger for households reporting some end-of-job payments. For
households not reporting any end-of-job payments nor running debt before job loss, no
effect of the replacement rate on changes in debt is found.
We ran some further tests to check whether the negative effect of the replacement ratio
on the change in debt is due to households postponing to pay off debt or borrowing extra
debt or a combination of the two. To this end, we split the subsample of households in
debt at tk into households with a ‘low’ (smaller than the median) and with a ‘high’ (larger
than the median) value of the importance adjusted replacement rate and we looked at the
distribution of changes in debt (see Table 7). Households with a ‘low’ replacement rate
appear to be paying off debt relatively less often, and running up debt relatively more
often, than households with a ‘high’ replacement rate. This result is more pronounced if
we separate out households (not) reporting positive (any) end-of-job payments. There is
evidence that households reporting positive end-of-job payments pay off debt relatively
more often, but run up debt relatively less often than households not reporting any end-
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of-job payments.
As an additional check, we ran two Tobit regressions: in the first, we censored the
change in debt for values of zero and lower, implying that we concentrate on the analysis
of increases in debt and in the second, we censored the change in debt for values of zero
and higher (concentrating on decreases in debt, or, the paying off of debt). Table 8
displays the estimated coefficients on the replacement rate, which show that the results
found earlier (table 6) carry over to the separate analysis of increases and decreases in
debt. Therefore, we conclude that the negative effect of the replacement rate on changes
in debt is due to households both paying off debt and running additional debt.
6 Sensitivity analysis
We ran some additional sensitivity analysis. For consumption changes we ran an
ordered probit regression. As shown in Table 3, a number of respondents report no change
in consumption from one month before unemployment to three months after. This may be
due to rounding or recall error. The ordered probit explicitly accounts for the occurrence
of a spike at the point of no change in consumption. It is also less sensitive to inaccuracies
in the reported consumption values, since it uses interval-grouped consumption changes.29
We divided the change in relative consumption into five classes, according to the value
of the relative change in consumption: (i) a positive value; (ii) zero value; (iii) negative
but not lower than -25%; (iv) between -25% and -50%, (iv) between -50% and -75%; (v)
lower than -75%. We included the same covariates as in regression 2 in Table 4. The
results of estimation indicate that the qualitative conclusions are robust with respect to
the method of estimation: all the covariates that have a significant impact in the OLS
regression are significant in the ordered Probit and show the same sign.
So far the paper has not dealt with individual differences in expected unemployment
duration. Households in a county with a high unemployment rate may expect the un-
employment spell to last longer and be more careful in running down assets. Moveover,
29 However, this decreased sensitivity may come at the loss of information due to the interval-grouping
of consumption changes.
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access to credit may be harder for the unemployed when the unemployment rate is higher.
However, spacial differences in the level of unemployment may be stable over time, so that
individuals in areas with higher (lower) unemployment than the rest of the country may
(not) have anticipated the job loss and accumulated more (less) assets than the average.
We re-ran the regressions for changes in consumption, financial wealth and debt, including
the local rate of unemployment among the regressors. We found that the local unemploy-
ment rate did not have a significant effect, neither in the model for consumption, nor in
the models for financial wealth and debt.
We experimented alternatively with including a measure of the expected duration
of the individual unemployment spell. Using the results of estimation of a hazard rate
model of unemployment estimated on the same data (Stancanelli, 1999), we computed the
predicted hazard rate of moving from unemployment into employment for the household
heads in the sample and added it to the regressors.30 The coefficient estimate of the
predicted hazard turned out not to be significant in any regression.
To test for the robustness of the estimates on financial wealth, we experimented with
using an alternative measure of wealth that included only money held in a current account
or a deposit account. This is a more restrictive, though more homogenous, measure of
financial wealth. The qualitative results of the analysis of changes in financial wealth did
not change either: no impact of the replacement rate on changes in financial wealth could
be detected.
7 Conclusions
Allowing job losers to smooth consumption is one of the motivations for the existence
of an unemployment insurance benefit system. However, until recently little empirical
evidence on the consumption smoothing role of benefits was available. To shed light on
30 There are some identification problems with this approach as the same variables which are included
in the consumption equations are also included in the hazard as the theory provides no exclusion re-
strictions. Also, this extended model would imply that individuals can perfectly foresee the duration of
their unemployment spell, which is an extreme assumption, under which individuals might also be able
to smooth consumption completely.
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the impact of unemployment benefits on consumption, the relationship between unem-
ployment benefits and, respectively, financial wealth and debt holdings -which notably
provide the unemployed with alternative instruments to smooth consumption- also de-
serve attention. Liquidity constraints play an important role in the theoretical models
that form the background for the empirical analysis.
We have modeled and estimated the effect of an income shock due to the job loss
experienced by the head of the household on the household’s consumption, financial wealth
and debt behaviour. In our model, the income shock is given by the decrease registered in
the income of the household head as measured by the replacement ratio. The consumption
variable is the household’s weekly food expenditure.
Using data on a sample of job-losers from the Survey of Living Standards during
Unemployment, a longitudinal inflow sample of the unemployed in Great Britain, we find
that the average household in our sample experienced a decrease in (food) consumption
of 17%, three months into the unemployment spell. We find that following the job loss
a smaller number of households reported positive amounts of financial assets and median
household assets fell. Instead, the number of households running debt increased.
One could argue that the observed changes in consumption, financial wealth and debt
may result from a downward macro-economic trend. However, a comparison of survey
respondents over a longer period of time reveals that the consumption levels of job losers
recover to the levels preceding the job loss for those re-entering employment, whereas they
remain low for individuals who stay unemployed throughout the period. Furthermore, the
income shock measured by the benefit replacement ratio is clearly specific to job losers.
Information from the FES (1982) suggests that the observed change in consumption is
consistent with a change in the labour market state.
If we do not allow for heterogeneity of household behaviour, no significant relation
between the replacement rate and changes in food consumption is detected. If we allow
the model to differ for households reporting a positive amount of financial wealth and
households reporting no possession of any financial wealth, we find that households re-
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porting no financial wealth experience a larger decrease in consumption the lower is their
replacement rate. This is in line with the interpretation that households reporting no
financial wealth are liquidity constrained, which adds to the role of unemployment bene-
fits as a consumption smoothing instrument. Furthermore, it is possible that the income
shock affects other components of the household total consumption function than food
expenditure, which are not looked at in this study.
The quantitative implication of our analysis is that a decrease in the replacement rate
of 10% results in a fall in food expenditure of 2%, for households reporting no financial
wealth. Gruber (1997), who uses US data, finds a decrease of 2.5% in food consumption
for all households in his sample. Browning and Crossley (2001) also found heterogene-
ity between households reporting positive financial wealth and households reporting no
financial wealth. They find that a cut in the replacement rate of 10% results in a 1.3%
fall in total expenditures for households that report a zero amount of assets at job loss.
In addition, we find that households that receive (higher) end-of-job payments experi-
ence a lower decrease in consumption. This provides evidence that households use other
financial resources to smooth (food) consumption, if they can afford it.
According to the theory, if households have a sufficiently high level of financial wealth,
they will use it to smooth consumption in response to the downward income shock. Our
empirical findings on the impact of the replacement rate on assets decumulation, suggest
that either financial wealth is not sufficiently high or households are reluctant to use their
financial wealth, as they have a precautionary savings motive and are uncertain about the
length of their unemployment spell. On the other hand, we find evidence of heterogeneity
in the relationship between the replacement rate and changes in debt. The results of
estimation suggest that increases in debt result either from the postponement of paying
off debt or from increased borrowing, the change in debt depending on the size of the
replacement ratio. The finding of an insignificant relationship for households without
debt before job loss may be explained by the binding of borrowing constraints.
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Table 1: Sample statistics: discrete background variables, sample percentages (n = 1315)
Gender:
male 94.8%
female 5.2%
Marital status: (time t1)
married 82.7%
unmarried 17.3%
Houseownership and mortgage: (time tk)
houseowner without mortgage 8.1%
houseowner with mortgage 32.5%
renter 59.4%
Skill level:
professional, intermediate worker 24.5%
skilled worker 45.5%
semi-skilled/unskilled worker 30.0%
Employment status spouse (time t1)
spouse employed 28.5%
spouse not employed 71.5%
Number of children (time t1)
no children 32.2%
one child 24.0%
two children 26.0%
more than two children 17.8%
Young children (time t1) (age < 5)
no young children 71.0%
young children 29.0%
Worked part time before job loss
part time 3.7%
full time 96.3%
Industrial sector
other manufacturing 12.1%
construction 16.3%
chemistry engineering 24.9%
hotel and catering 15.8%
other industries 30.9%
# unemployment spells in past 5 years
none 45.3%
one 25.1%
two 14.0%
more than two 15.6%
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Table 2: Sample statistics: The distribution of continuous variables
Variable mean quantiles
n = 1315 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Savings tk £ 1411 0 0 121 700 2642
Savings t1 £ 2310 0 0 30 855 5002
debt tk £ 544 0 0 0 400 1100
debt t1 £ 532 0 0 60 400 1070
net wealth tk £ 867 -776 -170 4 500 5490
net wealth t1 £ 1778 -924 -263 0 701 4830
consumption tk pennies weekly 3125 1500 2000 3000 4000 5000
consumption t1 pennies weekly 2511 1200 1800 2500 3000 4000
age t1 38.6 24 28 37 49 55
Net earnings tk pennies weekly 9610 5400 6800 8500 11000 15000
Benefits t1 pennies weekly 4020 2500 2520 4045 4959 6150
replacement ratio 0.49 0.21 0.30 0.44 0.64 0.80
earnings head/total househ. inc. tk 0.82 0.57 0.70 0.86 1 1
Other income tk pennies weekly 2289 0 0 1350 3405 5646
Other income t1 pennies weekly 2199 0 58 1170 3170 5679
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Table 3: Observed relative changes in consumption, financial assets and debt
variable observation total positive no end-of-job
period sample savings payments
(n = 1315) (73.5%) (72.2%)
Mean ∆Ct/Ct−1 Time K to 1 -0.17 -0.17 -0.19
Median ∆Ct/Ct−1 Time K to 1 -0.17 -0.17 -0.20
% with ∆Ct/Ct−1 < 0 Time K to 1 58.6 56.3 63.0
% with ∆Ct/Ct−1 = 0 Time K to 1 37.4 40.1 32.7
% with ∆Ct/Ct−1 > 0 Time K to 1 4.0 3.6 4.3
At: mean savings Time K 1411 1919 946
Time 1 2310 3078 1049
At: median savings Time K 121 306 61
Time 1 30 183 3
Sample % with At > 0 Time K 73.5 100 68.3
Time 1 67.5 87.3 58.7
Mean ∆ ln(1 + At) Time K to 1 -0.40 -0.76 -0.93
% with ∆At < 0 Time K to 1 41.2 56.0 46.5
% with ∆At = 0 Time K to 1 32.8 13.0 41.0
% with ∆At > 0 Time K to 1 26.0 30.9 12.5
Dt: mean debt Time K 544 573 577
Time 1 532 558 635
Dt: median debt Time K 0 0 20
Time 1 60 50 105
Sample % with Dt > 0 Time K 48.0 46.2 51.1
Time 1 58.4 55.7 65.6
mean ∆ ln(1 +Dt) Time K to 1 0.48 0.43 0.76
% with ∆Dt < 0 Time K to 1 24.5 25.1 22.9
% with ∆Dt = 0 Time K to 1 42.2 44.6 37.0
% with ∆Dt > 0 Time K to 1 33.3 30.3 40.1
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Table 4: OLS regression for changes in consumption
Dep. var.: ∆C/C Regression 1 Regression 2
Variable (n = 1315) estimate se estimate se
Intercept -0.16 0.10 -0.08 0.11
Import. of inc. for househ. -0.011 0.093 -0.026 0.109
Import. ×ι(Atk > 0) – – 0.110 0.095
Import. ×ι(endjobpay > 0) – – 0.025 0.095
Importance × repl. rate 0.05 0.05 0.22** 0.07
Imp. × repl. rat ×ι(Atk > 0) – – -0.21** 0.07
Imp. × repl. rat ×ι(endjobpay > 0) – – -0.12 0.08
ι(Atk > 0) 0.001 0.014 -0.17** 0.07
ι(end-of-job pay > 0) -0.005 0.019 -0.075 0.072
Amount end-of-job payments 0.011** 0.004 0.008** 0.004
Amount end-of-job paym. squared -0.00022 0.00013 -0.00013 0.00013
ι(debt tk > 0) -0.007 0.012 -0.006 0.012
Net earnings tk -0.015** 0.005 -0.017** 0.005
Net earnings tk squared 0.00041** 0.00011 0.00044** 0.00011
Other income tk 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.006
House owner 0.054** 0.024 0.048** 0.024
House with mortgage 0.010 0.015 0.011 0.015
Professional, intermediate worker 0.035** 0.018 0.030* 0.018
Skilled worker -0.005 0.014 -0.003 0.014
Other manufacturing -0.019 0.020 -0.023 0.020
Construction -0.039** 0.019 -0.041** 0.019
Chemistry and engineering 0.004 0.016 0.006 0.016
Hotel and catering -0.021 0.019 -0.022 0.019
Part time job 0.084** 0.034 0.082** 0.034
Not unemployed in prev. 5 years 0.031** 0.014 0.031** 0.014
Age t1 0.0027** 0.0007 0.0026** 0.0007
Woman -0.060* 0.032 -0.058* 0.032
Married t1 0.026 0.023 0.031 0.023
Number of children 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.006
Any child with age < 5 0.046** 0.018 0.045** 0.017
Spouse employed tk 0.002 0.019 0.008 0.019
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Table 5: Regression for changes in savings, individuals reporting positive savings initially
Dep. var.: ∆ ln(1 + At) OLS Ordered probit Median regression
Variable (n = 967) estimate se estimate se estimate se
Intercept -4.62** 1.20 -1.81** 0.70 -2.53** 1.07
Import. of inc. for househ. 2.64** 1.14 1.00* 0.65 1.71* 1.01
Importance × repl. rate 0.19 0.56 0.19 0.32 -0.07 0.50
ι(end-of-job pay > 0) 0.88** 0.23 0.34** 0.13 0.32 0.20
Amount end-of-job payments 0.25** 0.06 0.24** 0.05 0.32** 0.06
Amount end-of-job paym. squared -0.0071** 0.0026 -0.0062** 0.0019 -0.01 0.00
ι(debt tk > 0) 0.24 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.13
Net earnings tk -0.15 0.07 -0.067 0.043 -0.15** 0.06
Net earnings tk squared 0.0024 0.0016 0.0007 0.0011 0.0026* 0.0014
Other income tk 0.11* 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.06
House owner 0.09 0.26 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.23
House with mortgage -0.14 0.17 -0.09 0.10 0.16 0.15
Professional, intermediate worker 0.08 0.22 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.19
Skilled worker -0.08 0.18 -0.17 0.11 -0.19 0.16
Other manufacturing -0.44* 0.24 -0.32** 0.15 -0.24 0.21
Construction -0.25 0.24 -0.04 0.14 0.13 0.21
Chemistry and engineering -0.24 0.20 -0.08 0.12 0.12 0.17
Hotel and catering -0.80** 0.23 -0.49** 0.14 -0.58** 0.20
Part time job -0.05 0.42 -0.34 0.25 -0.03 0.37
Not unemployed in prev. 5 years 0.38** 0.17 0.36** 0.10 0.24* 0.15
Age t1 0.040** 0.008 0.010** 0.005 0.03** 0.01
Woman 0.16 0.39 0.11 0.23 -0.15 0.34
Married t1 0.57** 0.28 0.11 0.17 0.33 0.25
Number of children -0.02 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06
Any child with age < 5 -0.11 0.22 -0.07 0.13 -0.28 0.19
Spouse employed tk 0.14 0.23 0.20 0.14 0.18 0.20
Intercept 2 0.46** 0.04
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Table 6: OLS regression for changes in debt
Dep. var.: ∆ ln(1 +Dt) Regression 1
Variable (n = 1315) estimate se
Intercept 0.77 0.94
Import. of inc. for househ. 1.57** 0.92
Import. ×ι(Dtk > 0, end− jobpay > 0) -2.42* 1.25
Import. ×ι(Dtk > 0, end− jobpay = 0) -1.11 0.80
Import. ×ι(Dtk = 0, end− jobpay > 0) -0.76 1.18
Importance × repl. rate 0.69 0.55
Imp. × repl. rat ×ι(Dtk > 0, end− jobpay > 0) -3.48** 0.88
Imp. × repl. rat ×ι(Dtk > 0, end− jobpay = 0) -1.37** 0.61
Imp. × repl. rat ×ι(Dtk = 0, end− jobpay > 0) -0.31 0.99
ι(Atk > 0) -0.09 0.13
ι(Dtk > 0, end− jobpay > 0) -2.61** 0.98
ι(Dtk > 0, end− jobpay = 0) -1.36** 0.60
ι(Dtk = 0, end− jobpay > 0) -0.14 0.85
Amount end-of-job payments -0.042 0.037
Amount end-of-job paym. squared 0.0015 0.0012
Net earnings tk 0.013 0.045
Net earnings tk squared -0.0015 0.0010
Other income tk 0.042 0.050
House owner -0.15 0.21
House with mortgage 0.42** 0.13
Professional, intermediate worker 0.06 0.16
Skilled worker 0.10 0.13
Other manufacturing -0.24 0.18
Construction 0.05 0.17
Chemistry and engineering -0.18 0.15
Hotel and catering 0.31* 0.17
Part time job -0.20 0.31
Not unemployed in prev. 5 years 0.05 0.12
Age t1 -0.017 0.006
Woman 0.29 0.29
Married t1 -0.22 0.21
Number of children 0.12** 0.05
Any child with age < 5 0.03 0.16
Spouse employed tk 0.01 0.18
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Table 7: Observed changes in debt for households running debt initially, for ‘high’ and
‘low’ values of the importance weighted replacement rate
variable Households with Dtk > 0 Households with Dtk > 0 Households with Dtk > 0
no end-of-job paym. end-of-job paym.
(n = 631) (n = 485) (n = 146)
Imp. repl. rat. Imp. repl. rat. Imp. repl. rat.
≤ median > median ≤ median > median ≤ median > median
% ∆Dt < 0 49.2 52.8 41.9 47.2 66.7 81.1
% ∆Dt = 0 9.2 9.2 8.6 9.5 10.8 7.6
% ∆Dt > 0 41.6 38.0 49.6 43.4 22.6 11.3
We used the median of the importance weighted replacement rate
for the subsample of households running debt at tk
Table 8: One-sided (Tobit) regression for changes in debt
Dep. var.: ∆ ln(1 +Dt) ∆Dtk > 0 ∆Dtk < 0
Variable (n = 1315) estimate Estimate
Importance × repl. rate 2.1* —
Imp. × repl. rat ×ι(Dtk > 0, end− jobpay > 0) -6.8** -2.6**
Imp. × repl. rat ×ι(Dtk > 0, end− jobpay = 0) -3.3** -1.4*
Imp. × repl. rat ×ι(Dtk = 0, end− jobpay > 0) 1.6 —
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